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This  paper  develops  a  framework  of endogenous  formation  of wage-bargaining  institutions 
regarding the level at which unions and firms negotiate in industries with market power.  We show 
that economic factors,  such  as  asymmetries in productive efficiency and bargaining power, are 
responsible  for  the  en~ ',gence  of various  degrees  of bargaining  centralization.  An all  union-
efficient firms  majorit)  coalition typically establishes an extra stage of wage negotiations at the 
sectorial level.  If, for given bargaining powers, the productivity differences are sufficiently high, 
wage negotiations are also conducted at firm-level. Otherwise, the (minimum) wage bargain struck 
at the  sectorial level  is  simply confirmed by both, firms and unions.  This is  a case of complete 
bargaining centralization.  If, however,  technological and bargaining power asymmetries cancel 
out,  wage negotiations are conducted only at the firm level (decentralized bargaining). 
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Real-life institutions of wage and employment determination through bargaining 
display substantial variability regarding the timing, scope, and level of union-firm 
negotiations.  While, for instance,  in EU countries wage negotiations are typically 
sequentially conducted, in Japan wages are negotiated simultaneously.  In most cases 
bargaining takes place about wages alone, while there is some evidence that negotiations 
may involve other variables as well (e.g. employment).  A striking variability is,  in 
particular, observed regarding the level at which negotiations are conducted.  In USA, 
Canada and Japan bargaining occurs at firm-level alone.  In Europe negotiations take place 
at all  three, national, sectorial and firm level in Belgium and Greece; mainly at both, 
national and sectorial level in Germany and  Scandinavia; typically at both, sectorial and 
firm level in Italy, the Netherlands and Spain; at the sectorial level alone in France and 
Portugal; mainly at firm level in the UK and Ireland.(Layard et al.  (1991)).  A natural 
question,  therefore, arises:  Why does such a variety of bargaining institutions exist across 
countries? How these institutions emerge?  So far,  economic theory has hardly addressed 
such type of questions. 
Our aim is  to develop a theory of endogenous formation of bargaining institutions. 
We propose that economic factors,  such as  asymmetries in productive efficiency and 
bargaining power, are  responsible for the evolution of different institutions across 
countries, or industries within a country. In this paper we restrict attention to the level at 
which  wage-negotiations are conductedl.  Recently, the literature has recognized the 
lSome  recent  papers  have  paid  attention  on how  the  scope  of bargaining  (i.e.  the 
arguments about which firms  and unions negotiate) may be endogenously determined (see 
Espinoza & Rhee (1989), Eberwein & Kollintzas (1995) and Petrakis & Vlassis (1995)). 
1 crucial role that the  level of negotiations (the degree of bargaining centralization) plays for 
the determination of wage-employment-output equilibria (Hoe I (1989 & (1990),  Dorwick 
(1989),  Corneo (1993),  Padilla et al.  (1994».  If, for  instance,  wage negotiations take 
place independently and simultaneously at the fIrm  level (decentralized bargaining), wages 
are lower,  and thus employment is higher, than under centralized bargaining, at the 
sectorial levee.  This literature, however,  treats the level of negotiation as an exogenous 
institution.  Moreover, only the cases of complete centralization, or complete 
decentralization are explicitly considered.  There is  no attempt soever to explain under 
which circumstances each of these polar cases emerges.  Further, there is  no explanation 
why  bargaining may  in fact be conducted at various (e.g.  both  sectorial and fIrm),  levels 
as  in many  labour market systems. 
Our approach builds on the fundamental postulate:  Institutional arrangements are 
created if a "winning" coalition of agents,  each acting  for  its own interest,  fInds  their 
establishment beneficial.  An agent in our context is either a fIrm  or a fIrm's union.  This 
is the  only natural assumption,  especially in an asymmetric world where conflicts of 
interests among  the different firms 'unions are usually present.  On these grounds,  we 
develop a framework of endogenous determination of alternative level-of-wage bargaining 
setups,  in industries with market power.  In particular, we consider a homogeneous good 
industry where  technologically asymmetric fIrms compete a hi Cournot in the product 
market.  In the labour market fIrms bargain with unions over wages,  while employment 
decisions  are left to the employers' discretion (right-to-manage).  Unions may, on 
2 This holds when the scope of negotiations covers only wages (right-to-manage) and the 
product  market  is  imperfectly  competitive.  It  is  evident,  as  long  as  agents  inside  each 
bargaining unit  (a  firm  and  its  union)  do  not internalize the  industry-wide effects of their 
decisions.  Therefore, competitive wage-cutting incentives drive wage bargains downwards. 
2 principle, possess different bargaining powers3.  Negotiations are conducted at both firm-
level and industry (sectorial)-level only if such an institution has been collectively decided 
by a simple majority, during an initial institution selection stage
4
•  In this case, the pivotal 
voter' s most-preferred wage is  first established as the (minimum) sectorial wage. 
Following which,  a firm and its own union may,  or may not, decide to enter a firm-level 
bargaining session to increase the firm-specific wage beyond the minimum sectorial one. 
On the other hand,  if this institution has not been chosen, firms bargain with their own 
unions,  in parallel sessions, over firm-specific wages alone.  Finally, employment and 
production decisions are taken by the firms. 
Our cental result is  that technological and relative bargaining power asymmetries 
are those that generate incentives for bargaining arrangements beyond the natural firm-
level negotiations.  In the latter, completely decentralized, bargaining regime, 
technologically superior firms pay much higher wages than their inefficient rivals, if 
unions' bargaining powers do not differ substantially.  As a result, an efficient firm 
partially loses its potential cost advantage due to  its relatively higher cost of labour.  Our 
analysis highlights the  strategic role that a minimum sectorial wage may play in the rivalry 
among,  efficient and  inefficient, firms.  Once established, the technologically inferior 
firms are obliged to pay at least this wage to their employees.  Therefore, efficient firms 
will opt for establishing a minimum sectorial wage in order to reduce wage differentials, 
3Technological and bargaining power asymmetries are also considered in Padilla et al. 
(1994).  The  authors  analyze  the  ensuing  vertical  spillovers  between  labour  and  product 
markets, however under a given institutional setup (decentralized bargaining). 
4 In the institution selection stage, a union  (a firm) will do search for potential  partners 
to  form  a  winning  coalition as  far  as  it expects  benefits  from  the  institution that  such  a 
coalition is  able to establish. We implicitly assume here that this type of communication is 
costless. 
3 and thus retain their relative cost advantage.  On the other hand, unions have a primary 
incentive to  settle some minimum wage,  since a backup wage typically improves the 
bargaining position of a union during the negotiation with its own firm. 
To introduce a minimum wage bargain, efficient firms will therefore search for 
potential partners among unions to form a "winning" coalition, i.e. a coalition which has 
the decisive power to establish this institution.  If  institutional decisions are taken by  the 
majority rule, an all-union -- efficient firms coalition would then be able to settle an 
additional stage of wage negotiations at the sectorial level.  In this way, an institution 
introducing an extra (sectorial) level of wage bargaining is endogenously formed by an 
adequate subset of agents,  each acting for its own interest. 
Our analysis entails two variations of the above bargaining setup (once established). 
Consider, for instance, an industry with two firms,  one of them endowed with a superior 
technology.  If  the differences in productivity are small enough, firm level negotiations 
will  never take place.  The pivotal voter is the efficient firm,  which opts for a sufficiently 
high industry-level minimum wage to steal market share from its competitor.  This case is 
observationally equivalent to a completely centralized bargaining at the industry level. 
Nonetheless,  the wage outcome (confirmed by both firms and their own unions) on 
principle differs from that of an ad-hoc centralized bargaining regime.  On the other hand, 
if productivity differences are sufficiently high, the inefficient firm's union will resist a 
high minimum wage to avoid marginalization of its own firm and thus guarantee some 
employment for  its own members.  Wage negotiations are realized at firm  level also, but 
only between the efficient firm and its own union. The inefficient firm and its union 
simply confirm the wage bargain struck at the sectorial level of negotiations.  This provides 
a case of a partially decentralized bargaining regime which is in fact observed in some 
4 real-life labour market systems. 
If, however, technological and relative bargaining power asymmetries "cancel out", 
thus leading to equal wages for both efficient and inefficient firms,  there are no  strategic 
incentives for bargaining arrangements beyond the (natural) decentralized regime. In fact, 
efficient firms enjoy their full cost advantage under decentralized bargaining, and therefore 
have no interest to introduce industry level negotiations.  Note, that bargaining at the firm 
level alone also takes place always if there are no asymmetries  in both, productive 
efficiency and bargaining power. 
The rest of the paper is  organized as follows.  In Section 2 our model is  developed 
and the decentralized bargaining case is  analyzed.  Section 3 analyzes wage negotiations 
conducted at both,  sectorial and firm level.  The strategic role of the minimum sectorial 
wage is  particularly highlighted.  Section 4 shows that there are often incentives for a 
majority of agents to establish an extra stage of wage bargaining at the sectorial level. 
Which in turn, effectively, determines if bargaining is centralized or partially 
decentralized.  In section 5 the  implications of the endogeneity of the degree of bargaining 
centralization for the  wage structure, employment, production and social welfare are 
analyzed.  Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2. The Model 
We consider a homogeneous good industry  where two firms,  on principle 
endowed with different  technologies, compete in the product market by choosing 
simultaneously their quantities.  For simplicity, we  assume that production technologies 
5 exhibit constant returns to  scale and require only labour input to produce the good
5
• Let 
firm 2 possess a superior technology than firm  1.  We shall call firm 1 "inefficient" and 
firm 2 "efficient". In particular, firm l's production function is y]=ANl' and firm 2's is 
Y2=kAN2 with  k~l, where Yi  denotes firm i's output and N;  its employment level. A>O is 
the productivity of labour when combined with the inefficient technology, and k is a 
measure of relative efficiency of technologies.  We further assume, for tractability reasons, 
that market demand is  linear and is given by P(y) =a-Y,  where Y is the aggregate output 
The labour market is unionized.  Workers are assumed to be organized  into  two 
separate,  firm-specific unions.  This is appealing,  since different technologies may require 
workers of distinct specialization.  Also, since firms' technological asymmetries often 
create conflicts of interests between firms' unions.  Let union i be the firm i's union. 
Abusing slightly the terminology, we  shall refer to the (in)efficient firm's union as 
(in)efficient union.  Assume that unions are of the utilitarian type with risk-neutral 
members (Oswald (1982». Then union's i objective is to maximize 
(1) 
where wi  is the negotiated wage and  Wo  is the backup option. That is,  Wo is an 
unemployed union member's expected income.  It can be thought as a weighted average of 
the competitive wage and the unemployment benefits with weights the probability of being 
employed, or not,  in the competitive sector.  Unions are, on principle, endowed with 
different bargaining powers during the negotiations with their own firms.  Union l'  s 
bargaining power is  f3,  and union 2'  s is y,  with f3  greater, equal, or smaller than y. 
5For instance, a firm, endowed with a two-factor Leontieftechnology, produces with such 
a linear  one-factor (labour) technology  in the  short-run,  if its amount of capital is  not too 
small. 
6 Negotiations take place over wages alone,  leaving employment to the firms' 
discretion (Right-to-Managet Wage negotiations are conducted at firm-level alone, or at 
both,  sectorial and firm,  level according to the established institution. If  the prevailing 
institution is decentralized bargaining, then firm/union pairs bargain in parallel sessions, 
each about its firm-specific wage.  If the established (by the interested parties) institution 
is  two-level wage bargaining, then the sectorial wage is first collectively negotiated by all 
firms and unions
7
•  Following which,  firm/union pairs may enter into parallel firm-level 
negotiation sessions to increase the firm-specific wage beyond the (minimum) sectorial 
one.  If,  at this stage,  neither a firm,  nor its  own union,  find beneficial such an increase, 
they simply confirm the minimum wage as  the firm-specific wage.  During the all union-
firm negotiations stage,  the pivotal voter's most-preferred wage is established as the 
sectorial wage.  Firm-specific wages are then determined with the use of the Generalized 
Nash Bargaining solution with the restriction that they can never be lower than the 
sectorial wage. 
Decentralized firm-level bargaining is  assumed to be the status quo institution.  This 
is  appealing, especially in an asymmetric world where different firms' unions often have 
conflicting interests.  Wage-bargains are then conducted at the firm-level alone, except if a 
"winning" coalition of agents,  each acting for its own interest, finds the establishment of 
collective industry wage-bargains beneficial.  To model this we add an institution selection 
stage that precedes any  wage-negotiations.  Interested parties (firms and unions) vote in 
6The scope of bargaining is about wages alone and it is exogenously given here. Petrakis 
& Vlassis (1995) characterize the labour and product market conditions under which Right-to-
Manage emerges as an endogenously determined institution in a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
7 Assuming mandatory extension of collective industry bargains, the sectorial wage is in 
fact the minimum wage for all firms in the industry. 
7 favour,  or against, the introduction of an additional wage-bargaining stage at the sectorial 
level.  Each party is assumed to have one vote. If  collective industry wage bargains obtain 
a simple majority of votes, two (sectorial and firm)-level wage negotiations emerge as the 
new  institutions.  Otherwise, the status quo, one (firm)-level institution prevails. 
To summarize, the timing of the game is  as follows.  In the first stage, firms and 
unions vote  for  the bargaining institution according to which wage negotiations will be 
conducted. In case that two-level wage bargains are chosen as the prevailing institution, all 
firms and unions negotiate to  settle a minimum wage for the  sector in the second stage.  In 
the third stage, firm/union pairs negotiate in parallel sessions, each about its firm-specific 
wage (given that the established sectorial wage acts as  a wage floor).  If, on the other 
hand,  decentralized bargaining prevails, the game proceeds to the third stage (where, 
however, a wage floor is  absent).  Firms make simultaneously their employment decisions 
in the forth stage.  Finally, firms compete a la  Cournot in the product market. We  assume 
that all parties, while voting for an institution or negotiating about wages,  take into 
account the implications of their decisions on the subsequent stages of the game.  That is, 
we  shall restrict attention to  subgame perfect equilibria. 
Let us  first consider the employment and product market stages of the game.  Note, 
that given our one-factor (labour) linear technologies, a firm' s decision on employment 
also determines its output.  Thus, employment and production stages can be reduced to a 
single stage where firms compete in the market by simultaneously choosing employment 
(or, outputs).  Let output be  the strategic variable.  Each firm then chooses its output to 
SIn fact, the procedure by which a new bargaining institution is established is along these 
lines  in  a  number  of countries.  In  Spain,  for  example,  a  group  of firms  and  unions, 
representing a majority of shareholders and workers, have the power to establish a new labour 
market institution (Jimeno (1992». 
8 maximize profits, taking as given the quantity produced by  its rival, and the wages 
resulted from the firm-level negotiations.  Firm l's profits are  1tl=(a-YFY~YFwly/A and 
firm 2'  s 1t2= (a-YF  Y~Y2-W2Y/kA.  Note, that one-factor (labour) linear technology implies 
that w/A (w/kA) is  the inefficient (efficient) firm's marginal cost of production.  The 
outcome of this Cournot game with asymmetric unit costs of production is  standard and is 
summarized in (2). 
Yl * (wl , w~  =  (a-2w/A +w/kA)/3  (2) 
c!1t/Cl',.:/JHj<O for all i,j=1,2, i.e.  wages are strategic substitutes from the firms' point of 
view.  That is,  an increase in the rival's wage raises a firm's marginal profitability of a 
wage cut.  On the  other hand,  substituting Ni* into union i's objective (given in (1», it 
can be checked that &U/Ow/JWj  >  0,  i.e.  wages are strategic complements from the 
unions' point of view.  An increase in the rival's wage (and thus in its marginal cost), 
improves a firm's competitiveness in the market.  It becomes then more profitable for its 
union to  press further for wage  increases,  since it does not lose as  much in terms of 
employment. 
Let assume,  for the moment, that decentralized bargaining is the wage-bargaining 
institution in effect. Then firm/union units negotiate in parallel sessions about firm-specific 
wages.  Firm i bargains with its own union over the firm-specific wage wi  taking as given 
the wage bargain, wj •  struck in the parallel firm/union j  negotiati6n session.  To obtain the 
negotiated wage we employ the generalized Nash Bargaining solution.  Firm/ union unit 
1 's  bargained wage then maximizes 
(3) 
with  1-~. and  ~ firm l'  s,  and union l'  s bargaining power, respectively.  The first order 
9 condition (foe) of (3)  gives firm/union unit l'  s reaction function, 
(4) 
A similar analysis applied to the firm/union 2 bargaining session provides the firm/union 
unit 2'  s reaction function 
(5) 
with l-y,  and y firm 2'  s, and union 2'  s bargaining power, respectively.  Note, that Wj 
increases with wj' i,j  = 1,2, that is,  wages are strategic complements from the viewpoint of 
firm/union bargaining units.  An increase in firm/union j  negotiated wage relieves the 
competitive pressure on firm i,  thus facilitating firm i'  s wage concessions to its union. 
Solving (4)  and (5)  we  get the negotiated wages under the decentralized bargaining regime 
lV/ =[aA~(4+y)  +  2{4(2-~)  +~(2-y)/k}wJ/(16-~y) 
w/ =k[aAy(4+~)  +  2{4(2-y)/k+y(2-~)}wJ/(16-~y) 
As expected, wj
d  is  increasing in the backup wage wo'  Note, that if unions possess the 
same bargaining  power W  =y), the efficient firm's wage is much higher than its 
inefficient rival's wage.  As a result, a great part of the efficient firm's  initial 
technological advantage is  dissipated due to wage negotiations being conducted in a 
decentralized way9.  If, in addition, wo=O,  then w/=kw/ and both, the efficient and 
(6a) 
(6b) 
inefficient,  firms face the same marginal cost of production. If, however, wo>O,  firm 2 
retains part of its technological superiority (since w/ < kw/ for  ~  =y). 
The efficient firm enjoys its full technological advantage whenever w/ =wt This 
holds,  if k=~(4+y)/y(4+~)=~(~,  y) provided that wo=O;  further,  if  wo> 0, then the 
higher the Wo  is,  the lower the y has to be for given ~ (see figure  1).  An inefficient 
9 On the contrary, if wage negotiations are centralized, the efficient firm enjoys its full 
initial  technological advantage.  This is  due to  centralized bargaining determining a single 
wage to be payed by all firms in the industry. 
10 union,  with sufficiently higher bargaining power than its efficient counterpart's, is often 
able to achieve an equally high wage,  despite the technological  inferiority of its firm 
(except if Wo  is sufficiently high,  where w/> w/ always).  As the backup wage increases, 
a union cares relatively less about wage increases comparing to employment cuts.  To see 
this,  from  (1) we get that -dw/dM= (wrwJIM,  which is decreasing in wo'  Then the 
inefficient union,  with the guarantee of a high backup wage,  will push less for  wage 
increases  in order to avoid the marginalization of its firm and the accompanying 
employment cuts.  The efficient union,  on the other hand,  can still push for a higher wage 
without  fearing  drastic employment reductions.  If,  on the contrary, the backup wage  is 
relatively small, w/ >  ~v/ as  long  as  y~~, or at least,  if the efficient union is not much 
weaker than the  inefficient union in the bargaining table.  The above are summarized in 
the following  proposition (see also figure  1). 
Proposition 1:  Under decentralized bargaining,  the negotiated wage in the 
efficient finn/union session is always higher than that of  the inefficient finn/union's one 
whenever the backup wage is sufficiently high.  For smaller backup wages,  it is higher if 
the efficient union is relatively stronger (y> P)  or,  if  the technological superiority of  the 
efficient finn compensates for the relative weakness of  its own union. 
Proof:  Note first that,  w/-w/={AaC(k)  +2D(k)wJ/(l6-~y) where  C(k) =y(4+~)k­
~(4+y) and D(k) =y(2-~)k-4(y -~)-~(2-y)/k, with C'  (k) > Oand D'  (k) > O.  Further, 
C(l) = 4(y-~) and D(l)  =-2(y-~). As wolA <a is a necessary condition for  the market to 
exist at all,  if y >~, we have w/> w/ for k=l, and thus for all k.  If, on the other hand, 
y<~, then D(k»O for  all k.  Further,  C(k)~O iff k~~(~,y); hence, w/>w/ under these 
parameter values,  too.  On the contrary,  if k<~(~,y) and wo=O,  then w/<w/. But for  Wo 
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4/ (Sk-l) and  is strictly positive for wo=Aa.  (In fact,  w/>w/for all wo> wo',  where 
wo' =AaC(k)/2D(k)).  Q.E.D. 
Note,  that if wo=O,  w/>w/ requires k to  be larger than  ~(P,  y).  However,  as  Wo 
increases,  this holds even for  lower k,  given the bargaining powers. 
Finally, the outputs,  aggregate employment,  firms profits and unions welfare under 
decentralized bargaining can be obtained by substituting (6)  into (2). 
YId = 2  (2-P)[aAk(4+y)-{ (8-y)k-2(2-y))wJI3Ak(16-Py) 
y/  = 2  (2-y)[aAk(4 +  ~)-{  (8-~)-2(2-~)k}wJI3Ak(16-~y) 
Further, }f=N/+N/=y/IA+y/lkA and n/=(y;df Also,  from the foc  of (3) we get 
(7a) 
(7b) 
U/=3p(y/lI2(2-P) and  U/=3y(Y/lI2(2-y). Note that as  Wo  increases, both outputs and 
aggregate employment,  as  well as  firms' profits and unions' rents decrease. 10.11 
3.  Sectorial-level Wage Negotiations:The Strategic Role of 
l\1inimum Wage 
Suppose next that the established institution enables wage negotiations at both, 
sectorial and firm,  levels.  Let, for the moment,  wm  be the (minimum) wage bargain struck 
at  the sectorial level.  Mandatory extension of sectorial wage bargains requires then that 
the firm-level wage be at least as high as wm'  Hence, if wm turns out to be higher than the 
wage bargain would be struck at the firm level,  no such firm-level negotiation would in 
IOThis is true for values of k which are not too high. A sufficient condition is k to be less 
than 2,  If the technological asymmetries are strong, a corner solution may arise where only 
the  efficient firm  remains  active  in the  market.  To avoid this  case,  we  shall  restrict our 
analysis to k < 2 in the next section. 
IIHowever, a union's total welfare (most probably) increases with wo'  since all union's 
members enjoy now a higher alternative income. Figure-2 reaches a maximum at some  wm~vH' while U}*is  maximized at wm=max[vH'  mJ where 
mJi=w  cJ'2 + aAkl2 (2k -1) . 
Summarizing, as  the binding value of the sectorial wage increases (regions R2  and 
R3), the efficient firm's profits initially increase, in R2, and then decrease in R3, while 
the inefficient firm's profits decrease throughout. As far as  it concerns unions' rents, the 
efficient union's rents initially increase, reach a maximum inside R3,  and then decrease. 
The  inefficient union's rents initially increase, reach a maximum (either inside any of R2 
or R3,  or at their border), and subsequently decrease.  It is  now clear that three out of the 
four groups of agents,  each acting for its own interest, would opt for a sufficiently high 
Wm  so that the sectorial wage to become -binding for some, or all,  participants during the 
firm-level negotiations.  Whilst it  is  not surprising that both unions are happier with the 
guarantee of a minimum wage,  it  is  the  strategic pursuit of the efficient firm that enables 
the establishment of a sectorial wage floor.  It is  thus straightforward that,  three out of 
four,  would prefer bargaining at both, sectorial and firm,  levels over the status-quo 
decentralized bargaining. 
Let now proceed to the derivation of wm'  We assume that decisions are taken by 
simple majority rule.  Our postulate is  that the pivotal voter's most-preferred value of wm 
will be  selected as  the minimum sectorial wage.  This is  reasonable as  long as it is the 
pivot who delivers the coalition's decisive power12.  Then,  the optimal sectorial wage 
12This is one of a few possible working assumptions. Alternatively, it can be assumed that 
the minimum wage selected is the most-preferred one of the median voter. However, under 
an even number of voters (four in our case), the minimum wage chosen would be the average 
of the second and third's most  -preferred one. It is not clear, though, that such a choice would 
give to the second voter a welfare higher than if he had stayed out of the coalition. This, in 
turn, could drive to an alternative postulate, where the minimum wage would be selected so 
as  to  simply compensate the pivot for her participation. Nevertheless, most such alternative 
assumptions do not change the flavour of our results, though they typically lead to a higher 
sectorial wage. 
15 settlement is  summarized in the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: If  w/ < w/' then at the sectorial-level negotiations the two unions and the 
efficient firm form  a coalition which settles the minimum wage  wm =mL if  mL  <  VH'  and 
wm=vH otherwise. 
Proof:  From our discussion above, we know that the two unions and the efficient 
firm have incentive to form a coalition in order to impose a binding wm. If mL <  VH'  the 
pivot is  the  inefficient union and the selected  wm  will be its most-preferred sectorial wage, 
mL.  Otherwise, the pivot is the efficient firm.  Its most-preferred sectorial wage,  VH'  is 
then selected.  Q.E.D. 
The intuition is  as follows:  In case that mL <  VH'  the inefficient firm's union would 
resist a further wage increase, to avoid the marginalization of its own firm and the 
resulting low employment for  its  members.  This happens if, for instance, there exist 
significant differences in productivity between the two firms (large enough k). 
Consequently, firm-level negotiations will take place only between the efficient firm and 
its  own union to increase the wage above the minimum. The inefficient firm and its union 
will meet just to confirm wm  as the firm's wage.  Otherwise, both unions opt for a high 
minimum wage, but the efficient firm will only agree for a moderate value of wm.  In this 
case,  no  negotiation will in fact take place at the firm-level, since both firm/union pairs 
will simply confirm the minimum wage as the prevailing one in the industry. This usually 
happens when the productivity differences are not too large.  Note that,  in any case, the 
selected  wm  is  increasing in the outside wage, wo. 
Let us  now turn to case (ii) where w/=w/.  Recall that firm-level wage bargains 
are equal if technological and bargaining power asymmetries cancel out or, they are absent 
16 at first place. The efficient firm,  enjoying now its full  technological advantage, has no 
incentive to opt for a sectorial wage floor.  Note, that region 2 in figure 2 now collapses. 
Given then that both firms' profits decrease, while both unions' rents increase, in region 
3, there is  no possibility for a majority coalition to be formed.  At this point, the minimum 
sectorial wage cannot be determined by simply evoking our postulate. But, will be, in 
fact,  any need to  be determined? As  it is shown in the following section, a sectorial wage 
bargaining stage will never be  introduced by the interested parties. 
Finally, we  turn to case (iii) where w/ > w/ If  the  inefficient union is  sufficiently 
more powerful than the efficient one,  such as  to compensate for the technological 
deficiency of its  own firm,  the  wage paid by  the inefficient firm, under the decentralized 
regime,  is  higher.  This adds to the  inefficient firm's technological disadvantage, and thus 
aggravates its competitiveness.  It  is  now the inefficient firm that has incentive to use the 
sectorial wage strategically, to  restore part of its competitiveness by  reducing the wage 
wedge.  The analysis here is  analogous to case (i)  above,  so we  shall be brief in what 
follows. 
Define vL '=w/ and vH '::{aAPk+2(2-P)kwJ/(4k-P).  It can be checked that 
vL ' < vH'. Again,  if wm:$vL ',  W;*=W;d,  and  if wm~vH"  then w;*=wm , i=1,2. Finally, if 
(14) 
In a similar way,  regions RI "  R2', R3' are defined.  Note that the expressions for 
outputs, profits and union rents are the same as  in case (i), except for region R2' where 
we get, 
(15) 
)'2 '*={aAk(4+P) +2(2-P)kwo-(8-P)w,J112Ak  (16) 
17 Now,  firm l'  s output and profits increase,  while firm 2' s decrease,  as the minimum 
sectorial wage increases.  Note also,  that in contrast to case (i), both unions' rents increase 
in this region (Le.  aU;*/Owm>O,  i=1,2)13.  As  in case (i), three out of four, would opt 
for a sufficiently high wm'  As nonetheless, the following proposition demonstrates, the 
sectorial wage becomes now binding for all participants during the fIrm-level negotiations. 
Proposition 3: If w/ >  w/' then at the sectorial-level negotiations the two unions and the 
inefficient finn Jonn a coalition which settles the minimum wage wm =vH '  always. 
Proof:  Given that the  two unions' rents and the inefficient fIrm's profIts are 
increasing in R2 "  they have incentive to  form a coalition in order to impose a binding 
Wm'  The pivot here is the inefficient firm.  Therefore, its most-preferred sectorial wage, 
VH', will be selected.  Q.E.D. 
The intuition is  straightforward.  While both unions opt for a high minimum wage, 
the inefficient firm would only accept a moderate value of Wm'  No fIrm-level negotiation 
would ever take place.  Both firm/union pairs simply confirm the minimum wage as the 
prevailing one in the industry.  Note, again, that the selected minimum wage is increasing 
in the backup wage. 
4.  Institution Selection Stage 
We  next proceed to the institution selection stage.  This, in fact,  can be considered 
as  a constitutional stage,  since now interested parties vote in favour,  or against, the 
establishment of an additional, sectorial, level of wage bargaining beyond the status-quo 
13 It is obvious that aU1 */Owm  >  O.  To check aU2 */Owm  > 0, note that U2 *  is concave in wm' 
Further, aU2 */Cl1.'m evaluated at vH ', is  increasing in k,  and it is positive for the smallest k 
(k=1). 
18 firm-level negotiations. We assume that each firm,  and each union, has one vote, and that 
decisions are taken by the simple majority rule.  In the previous section we have shown 
that,  once a two-level bargaining procedure has been established, three out of four agents 
will impose a minimum sectorial wage which is binding for all  (cases (i) and (iii».  This 
is  so,  because they thus attain a higher utility level than under the status quo, decentralized 
bargaining setup.  Therefore, these agents will vote in favour of the establishment of 
minimum sectorial wage bargains. The endogenously chosen institution is, hence,  wage 
bargaining at both,  sectorial and firm,  levels. 
On the  contrary, in case (ii) we  have seen that two out of four agents (the two 
firms) always prefer wage bargains at the  firm level alone.  As  a consequence, they will 
vote against the establishment of minimum sectorial wage bargains.  The status quo, 
decentralized bargaining will therefore endogenously chosen.  These results are 
summarized by  the following proposition: 
Proposition 4:  'Whenever,  due to technological and bargaining power asymmetries, 
decentralized wage bargains turn  out to be unequal  (w/:t:w/), a two  (sectorial and jinn)-
level wage bargaining institution will be endogenously selected.  The  two unions and, 
either the efficient,  or the inefficient, finn will vote for the establishment of  minimum 
sectorial wage bargains.  If technological and bargaining power asymmetries cancel out 
(w/  =w/), decentralized bargaining is however endogenously selected. 
5.  Employment and Welfare Effects 
Our analysis entails various interesting implications regarding the structure of 
wages,  employment, production pattern and social welfare. If the level of wage bargains is 
endogenously chosen, wage differentials between efficient and inefficient firms should be 
19 typically expected to substantially decrease,  or even be eliminated.  Wages would be higher 
than under decentralized bargaining. As a result, aggregate production will be lower, the 
product price higher, and hence consumers' welfare lower.  Second, unions'  rents are 
always higher than if bargains were conducted at firm level alone.  The (in)efficient firm's 
profits increase, whilst its rival's profits decrease, depending on whether the (in)efficient 
firm has the initiative to establish the extra level of wage bargains. 
Third, the endogeneity of the level of wage bargains-institution induces a 
production shift towards the  "right direction"  (Le.  the efficient firm produces more), 
whenever the  status quo wage differential favours the inefficient firm.  If, on the contrary, 
it favours the efficient firm, we  should expect a production shift towards the  "wrong 
direction".  Finally, turning to  sectorial employment, we have clear negative effects only 
when production shifts to  the  "right direction". Recall that this occurs whenever the 
efficient firm pays higher status quo wage, due  its technological superiority which is not 
offset by any bargaining power relative advantage. Then the higher wages implied by the 
emerging complete, or partial, bargaining centralization at the sectorial level, accompanied 
by the  forementioned (labour saving) production shift, will naturally decrease aggregate 
employment. If  nonetheless, production shifts to the  "wrong direction" (labour 
augmenting),  whilst the wage increase effect is not strong enough, aggregate employment 
may in fact  increase. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we produce a framework of endogenous determination of the degree 
of centralization of firm-union wage bargains in oligopolistic industries.  We show that 
economic factors,  such as technological and bargaining power asymmetries, generate 
20 various degrees of centralization. For instance, an all union-efficient firms majority 
coalition has the incentive to establish industry-level wage negotiations.  In this case, if, 
for given bargaining powers, productivity differences are sufficiently high, firm-level 
wage negotiations are further conducted (partially decentralized bargaining).  If, however, 
productivity differences are small, complete bargaining centralization emerges. Finally, if 
technological and bargaining power asymmetries cancel out .(or being absent at first place), 
wage negotiations are conducted only at the firm level (decentralized bargaining). 
Productivity asymmetries have been also shown to determine the extent of 
centralization of negotiations in a rather different context. lun (1989) analyzes union 
formation decisions when a firm employs two groups of workers, a high- and a low-
productivity group. Before entering in wage negotiations with the firm, workers decide to 
form a joint union or two separate unions. If  productivity differences are small enough, a 
joint union is  established,  which then bargains with the firm about wage(s).  Otherwise, 
two separate unions are formed,  and then bargain simultaneously with the firm, each over 
its  own wage. 
There has,  recently, been rising interest in studying the macroeconomic 
implications of the degree of centralization of wage bargaining, amongst other dimensions 
of labour market institutions (see e.g. Calmfors & Driffil (1988), lackman et al (1990), 
limeno (1992». In particular, since the degree of bargaining centralization significantly 
affects long-run unemployment and  inflation rates, it is  important to understand and 
analyze the conditions under which a certain degree of centralization emerges in a 
particular environment.  Then policy measures can be designed with the purpose of 
abolishing existing inefficient institutions, and/or promoting the establishment of new more 
efficient ones.  Our findings suggest that it is  sufficient for a government to direct its 
21 policies towards a small number of interested parties, which in turn, acting for their own 
benefit, will promote the socially desired bargaining institution.  If, for instance, 
centralized bargaining is  targeted, the government could simply subsidize the adoption of 
superior technology by a small number of  firms.  The latter will then become pivots in the 
formation of a majority coalition (including all unions) which will subsequently promote 
the establishment of this institution. 
Our framework further predicts that sufficiently high unemployment benefits will 
eventually lead towards decentralization in wage bargains, whenever decision-making  is 
entirely left to the interested parties.  Normally, higher unemployment benefits induce a 
higher backup wage.  Let,  initially, wage negotiations be centralized, at the sectorial 
level.  A high backup wage will shift production to the  "right" direction (towards the 
efficient firm).  As  a consequence, the inefficient firm's union, fearing the marginalization 
of its own firm,  will now become the pivotal voter restraining sectorial wage increases. 
Firm-level wage negotiations will then be further conducted, however only between the 
efficient firm and its own union.  A partially decentralized wage bargaining system will 
thus be observed. Our prediction seems to be in line with recent evidence from Europe, 
displaying high unemployment rates accompanied with increasing decentralization on wage 
bargains (Jimeno (1992),  De  la Croix (1992)).  As our analysis suggests,  increasing 
decentralization may then due to higher unemployment benefits which have been 
persistently risen in Europe during the last decades, and might had thus led to increased 
backup options for the unionized workers. Decreasing aggregate employment, on the other 
hand,  might be due to the increased unemployment in the competitive sector, since there 
are ambiguous employment effects in the unionized sectors, as our framework predicts. 
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